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Article 4

The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule, I which suppresses evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment,2 has been heavily criticized by leading legal authorities2 Courts and commentators have suggested
changes in the exclusionary rule ranging from slight modification 4 to
complete abandonment.5 In United States v. Williams, 6 the United
1 The exclusionary rule, as used in this note, refers to the rule that excludes evidence
seized in violation of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
2

U.S. CONST. amend. IV

provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
3 Chief Justice Burger of the Supreme Court of the United States has called the rule
"poorly designed and [one that has] never really worked." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 424 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Referring to the exclusionary rule
in 1922, Dean Wigmore lamented that ."[our] way of upholding the [fourth amendment] is
not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to let offsomebody else who broke something else."
Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtainedby Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479, 484 (1922). Furthermore, Supreme Court Justice White has noted that, because the rule does not deter unlawful police action, "it [is] a senseless obstacle to arriving at the truth in many criminal
trials." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
4 Proposed modifications of the exclusionary rule include establishing a predominantly
civilian commission to adjudicate fourth amendment damages claims against police, Burger,
Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1964), holding the exclusionary
rule applicable only to substantial violations of the fourth amendment and the due process
clause, Sunderland, The Exclusiona,7 Rule.- A Requirement of ConstitutionalPrinciple, 69 J. CRIM.
L. & C. 141, 150-59 (1978), creating a good faith exception by which evidence seized wrongfully but in good faith would nevertheless be admissible, Bernardi, The Erclusionay Rule: Is a
GoodFaithStandardNeeded to Preserve a LiberalInterpretationof the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DE PAUL
L. REv. 51 (1980); Note, Reason and the Fourth Amendment-The Burger Court and The Exclusionag
Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 139 (1977); Friendly, The Bill ofRights as a Code of CriminalProcedaure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965), judging searches and seizures according to compliance
with legislative or police departmental regulations that are subject to judicial review for reasonableness, Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 409-39
(1974), applying the exclusionary rule when police departmental regulations, training programs, and disciplinary history indicate a failure to take the fourth amendment seriously,
Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1050-55 (1974), applying
the exclusionary rule only when the fourth amendment violation has been "substantial," Coe,
The ALI Substantiality Test: A Flexible Approach to the Exclusionaqy Sanction, 10 GA. L. REV. 1
(1975); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 290.2 (Official Draft 1975); 4

CAP. U.L. REV. 95 (1974); Wright, Maust the Criminal Go Free ifthe Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX.
L. REV. 736, 745 (1972).
5 See, e.g., Wilkey, The Exclusionag Rule. Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE
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States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted a good faith
exception as one such change. The court, sitting en banc, held that
"evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where it
is discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in
good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they
are authorized."' 7 The Williams holding was based on three premises:
(1) the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule are not co-extensive; (2) the exclusionary rule is justified only by its deterrent
value; and (3) the United States Constitution does not require the
exclusionary rule.8
This note examines the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. Part I reviews the history of the exclusionary rule regarding its
constitutional underpinnings; Part II discusses the case law addressing the good faith exception; and Part III analyzes the issues involved
in a decision whether to adopt the good faith exception.
I.

The Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Background

The first step in any discussion concerning the exclusionary rule
is resolving whether the United States Constitution requires the rule.
Certain legal scholars have, contrary to the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, proposed two independent constitutional
bases for the exclusionary rule. 9 The first arises from the fourth
amendment;10 the second arises from a due process right. t However,
both constitutional bases are grounded in the concept of judicial integrity; that is, courts should refuse to convict a person by using illegally seized evidence.
If the Constitution requires the suppression of all illegally seized
evidence, then evidence seized illegally is constitutionally inadmissible, good faith notwithstanding. However, if the exclusionary rule is
merely a judicially-created remedy, then a good faith exception is a
215, 231-32 (1978) (suggesting courts should hold a separate trial of the police, after the defendant's trial, in which police officers' fourth amendment violations are adjudicated and
sanctioned); Note, The Exdcusionafy Rule in Search andSeiure: Examination and Prognosis, 20 KAN.
L. REV. 768 (1972); Note, 4 Sw. U.L. REv. 68 (1972); Wingo, Growing Disillusionmentwith the
Exclusionay Rule, 25 Sw. LJ. 573 (1971).

6 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cerl. denied, 101 S. Ct. 946 (1981).
7 Id at 840.
8 Id at 840-41.
9 See Schrock & Welsh, Ulpflom Calandr" The Edcusionag,Rule as a ConstitutionalRequirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251, 379 (1979).

10 Id at 373.
11 Id
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permissible modification of that remedy.1 2 Good faith considerations
aside, the Supreme Court cannot require state courts to suppress illegally seized evidence if the Constitution does not require the exclusionary rule. Thus, the states would be free to experiment with other
13
methods of enforcing the fourth amendment.
Early Supreme Court decisions did not clearly indicate whether
the exclusionary rule arose out of the Constitution. In Boyd v. United
States,' 4 the Court held that requiring the defendant to produce certain papers was an invasion of his "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property,"' 5 and thus was an
unreasonable seizure violating the fourth amendment. Thus, the ext6
clusionary rule was first grounded in rights to property and privacy.
Similarly, in Weeks v. United States,17 holding the exclusionary rule
applicable to all federal courts,' 8 the Court did not declare expressly
that the rule was constitutionally required. The Court stated that
judicial and law enforcement efforts to convict the guilty "are not to
be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years
of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment
in the fundamental law of the land."19 However, that language
means that the fourth amendment must be more than an "empty
blessing, ' 20 and not that the exclusionary rule cannot exist apart
2
from the Constitution. '

The Court in Weeks noted two exclusionary rule rationales: privacy 22 and judicial integrity.2 3 In expressing the judicial integrity
12 See Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionagy Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 635, 651 (1978). But see Sunderland, supra note 4. See generall
Monaghan, Foreword- Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
13 Justice Harlan urged that the Court should encourage states to experiment with
fourth amendment enforcement. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 681 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("this Court should continue to forbear from fettering the states with an adamant
[exclusionary] rule which may embarrass them in coping with their own peculiar problems in
criminal law enforcement").
14 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
15 Id at 630.
16 For a discourse on returning to the property rationale for the fourth amendment, see
Schlesinger & Wilson, Property, Privacy and Deterrence: The ExclusionagRule in Search of a Rationale, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 225 (1980).
17 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
18 Id at 398.
19 Id at 393.
20 See Kamisar, The Exclusionaiy Rule In HistoricalPerspective.: The Struggle to Make the Fourth
Amendment More Than an Empty Blessing, 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979).
21 Contra, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
22 232 U.S. at 391, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ("[ut is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of his
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rationale for the first time, the Court stated that evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment "should find no sanction in the
courts" charged with upholding constitutional rights. 24 In Olmsteadv.
United States ,25 Justice Brandeis refined the judicial integrity
rationale:
If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means-to declare that the government may
of a private crimicommit crime in order to secure the conviction
26
nal-would bring terrible retribution.
Judicial integrity thus demands that federal courts exclude illegally
seized evidence to .avoid demonstrating "a manifest neglect if not an
27
open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution."
The next phase of Supreme Court search and seizure decisions
dealt with the exclusionary rule's use in state courts. In Wofv. Colorado,28 decided in 1949, the Court held that, although the fourteenth
amendment due process clause prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures by state police officers, it does not require state courts to ap29
ply the federal courts' exclusionary rule.

In 1960, however, the Court in Elkins v. UnitedStates30 reaffirmed
Wolf s concern for federalism by invalidating the "silver platter doctrine," which allowed a federal criminal trial to use evidence seized
illegally by state police officers. 3 ' The Court cited deterrence and
offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property").
23 232 U.S. at 392. The Court emphasized that
[t]he tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often
obtained after subjecting persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution ....
id
24 Id
25 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26 Id at 485. The Court continues to mention the judicial integrity rationale in its exclusionary rule decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458-59 n.35 (1976);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27 232 U.S. at 392.
28 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
29 Id"at 33.
30 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
31 R, at 223.
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judicial integrity as exclusionary rule rationales, 32 and emphasized
the rule's nonconstitutional nature in stating that the Elkins decision
did not affect "the freedom of the states to develop and apply their
'33
own sanctions in their own way."
Justice Frankfurter, however, argued in dissent that under the
Court's opinion in Elkins the states were no longer free to choose their
remedies. Pointing to several disparate fourth amendment decisions, 34 he maintained that the majority opinion meant that "fluctuating and uncertain views of what constitutes an 'unreasonable
search' under the Fourth Amendment in conduct by federal officials,
are to determine whether what is done by state police, whol'y beyond
federalsupervision, violates the Due Process Clause. '35 Thus, the real
issue before the Court, according to Justice Frankfurter, was the
Court's wisdom in applying federal fourth amendment standards to
strictly state-controlled police behavior. Justice Frankfurter argued
further that the Weeks exclusionary rule was a "court-developed
rule" applying only to federal officers, and that the Weeks opinion
found it "[un]necessary to say whether or not the rule of conduct
flows directly from the Constitution." 36 Justice Frankfurter concluded that, since the Weeks rule was an "evidentiary criterion unencumbered with weighty constitutional distinctions," 37 the Court
could not judge state-seized evidence by federal standards.
The constitutional impact of Elkins diminished when the Court
decided Mapp v. Ohio3 in 1961. In Mapp, the Court sought to cement
the exclusionary rule in a constitutional foundation by holding that
"all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
32 Id at 217, 222-23.
33 Id at 221. The Court underscored the distinction between its supervision of federal
courts and any interference with state court operations in declaring:
In determining whether there has been an unreasonable search and seizure by state
officers, a federal court must make an independent inquiry, whether or not there
has been such an inquiry by a state court, and irrespective of how any such inquiry
may have turned out. The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one
state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may have
colorably suppressed.
Id at 223-24.
34 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192 (1927).
35 364 U.S. at 239 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
36 Id at 244 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
37 Id
38 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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court."'39 In overturning its statement in Elkins that states were free

to develop their own fourth amendment sanctions, 40 the Court somewhat surprisingly stated that "the plain and unequivocal language of
Weeks-and its later paraphrase in Wolf-to the effect that the Weeks
' 41
rule is of Constitutional origin, remains entirely undisturbed.
Regardless of the Court's language in Mapp, the exclusionary
rule's rationale since 1961 has been deterrence. 42 In Linkletter v.
Walker, 43 the Court refused to apply Mapp retroactively because of a
lack of deterrent effect. 44 Justice Clark, who also authored Mapp,
noted in Linkletter that exclusionary rule cases since Wolf 45 uniformly
emphasized the need to deter illegal police action. 46 The Court in
Calandrav. United Sates47 strongly emphasized deterrence in holding
that a grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions based
39 Id at 655.
40 Se text accompanying note 33 supra. Only four justices agreed that the fourth amendment constitutionally requires the exclusionary rule. Justice Black concurred in the result,
stating that the fourth and fifth amendments together require the exclusionary rule. 367 U.S.
at 661-62 (Black, J., concurring).
41 Id at 649. Weeks and Wolf, contrary to the Court's bold statement, did not "plain[ly]
and unequivocal[ly]" state that the Weeks exclusionary rule was of constitutional origin. The
Court in -Wks emphasized that "[t]o sanction such proceedings [tainted with fourth amendment violations] would be to affirm by judicial decision a manitest neglect if not an open
defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people
against such unauthorized action." 232 U.S. at 394. The language of Weeks supports a judicial integrity rationale for the exclusionary rule, but does not indicate a constitutional foundation for it. Rather, the purpose of Weeks and Wolf was to provide some substance to the
fourth amendment's prohibitions. Both Weeks and Wofheld that the exclusionary rule did
not apply to the states, emphasizing the rule's nonconstitutionality.
42 The deterrence rationale first appeared in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) ("[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it shall not be used at all"), and was emphasized by the Court in E/kia, 364 U.S. at
217 ("[the exclusionary rule's] purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way--by removing the incentive to disregard it').
43 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
44 The Court in Link/eller rejected the general constitutional law theory that constitutional decisions must be retroactive. The Court stated that "the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect." Id at 629. The retroactivity question is thus a policy
matter that courts must resolve anew with each case, and a holding of nonretroactivity indicates neither a constitutional nor a nonconstitutional decision. See generaly Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105-07 (1971); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
45 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
46 381 U.S. at 636-37. Justice Clark's statement "effectively put an end to the short-lived
attempt to ground the exclusionary rule in a 'logically and constitutionally necessary' deduction from a fourth amendment 'right to privacy."' Schlesinger & Wilson, supra note 16, at
237.
47 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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on illegally seized evidence. 48 The majority stated that applying the
exclusionary rule to the grand jury context "would deter only police
investigation consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence
solely for use in a grand jury investigation. '49 The inadmissibility of
the illegally seized evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution of
the search victim substantially negates any incentive to disregard the
fourth amendment. 50 Thus, the Court in Calandra concluded that
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than
a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 5' Because the
Supreme Court has retained the Calandra interpretation of the exclusionary rule as primarily a deterrent, 52 the Court has substantially
resolved the rule's constitutional uncertainty, thus crumbling that
constitutional foundation so carefully laid in Mapp.
II.

The Exclusionary Rule: Emergence of a Good Faith
Exception

Due to the uncertainty of the exclusionary rule's constitutional
foundation, serious discussion of a good faith exception did not begin
until the 1970's. 53 Since Calandra and its progeny, 54 four Supreme
48 Id at 349-54.
49 Id at 351.
50 Id
51 Id at 348.
52 See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979) ("[t]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police action"); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 280
(1978) ("the exclusionary rule in this situation could not have the slightest deterrent effect on
the behavior of an officer"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) ("[t]he primary justification for the exclusionary rule. . . is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth
Amendment rights'); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) ("the 'prime purpose'
of the rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct' "); United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536 (1975) ("the Court has relied principally upon the deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule"); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974) ("the
exclusionary rule's 'prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct' '). Accord,
United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1980) ("the primary, if not the sole,
justification for the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth
Amendment rights"); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[t]he
exclusionary rule. . . is a judge-made rule. . . justified in the illegal search context only by
its deterrence of future police misconduct"), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 946 (1981).
53 Professor Ball states three reasons for the lack of attention given to the good faith
exception until the 1970's. One, the Court considered only whether subjective good faith
alone was enough to constitute probable cause. The Court soundly rejected mere subjectivity
in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1965). Two, the Court was not ready to curtail the exclusionary
rule's scope until its membership shifted in the early 1970's. Three, until Calandra'srenewed
emphasis on deterrence, great uncertainty existed concerning the possible constitutional underpinnings of the exclusionary rule. Ball, supra note 12, at 649-50.

NOTES
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Court justices have expressed an intent to modify the exclusionary
rule by adopting a good faith exception. 55 Numerous legal commenfor a good faith exception,5 6
tators in the past decade have also called
57
which the Fifth Circuit has adopted.
A.

The Supreme Court

Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents,58 stated that the pressures on police to prevent crime result in
"inadvertent errors ofjudgment" that work no grave injustice. 59 The
Chief Justice expressed concern that the exclusionary rule treats honest mistakes and flagrant fourth amendment violations equally. Burger urged that judicial responses should vary with the flagrance of
6°
the fourth amendment violation at issue.
The inevitability of honest mistakes in police investigations also
played a role in Michigan . Tucker.6 ' In Tucker, a pre-Mirandav. Arizona 62 decision, police officers questioned the defendant after giving
him all but one of the Miranda warnings. The defendant's statement
led to his conviction; he later sought post-Miranda habeus corpus relief. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, denied relief and declared that technical police error did not require the exclusionary
rule's application in a fifth amendment context, unless the exclusion
of evidence served the rule's deterrence rationale. 63 Because the police officers in Tucker acted in good faith and without knowledge of
54 See note 52 supra.
55 The four justices are Chief Justice Burger, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976)
(Burger, C.J., concurring); Justice White, id at 538 (White, J., dissenting); Justice Powell,
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); and Justice Rehnquist,
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537-39 (1975), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
446-47 (1974).
56 See note 4 supra; Ball, supra note 12.
57 See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 101 S. Ct. 946
(1981), and text accompanying note 94 infra.
58 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
59 Id at 418.
60 ChiefJustice Burger also urged the formation of a predominantly civilian tribunal to
adjudicate fourth amendment claims against police. All evidence, regardless of the circum- stances under which police officers seized it, would be admissible. Although the Chief Justice
did not expressly advocate a good faith exception, he did criticize the lack of distinction
between honest mistakes and flagrant violations. This criticism lies at the heart of a good
faith exception. Accord, Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 13 n.42
(1964).
61 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Tucker was a fifth amendment case, but nevertheless contributed
significantly to the development of a technical violation good faith exception.
62 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
63 417 U.S. at 447.
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the subsequent Miranda decision, exclusion of the evidence seized
would work no deterrence. The Court concluded that
[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least
negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.
By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct,
the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or
in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the
rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its
force. 64
United States v. Peltier65 involved a border search that occurred
before the Court's decision in United States v. Almeida-Sanchez. 66 The
search did not meet the Almeida-Sanchez standards. The police officers had complied, however, with the federal statutes, administrative regulations, and judicial precedent in force when the search
occurred. The Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, held that
Almeida-Sanchez would not be applied retroactively to the search in
Peltier because such application would not serve the exclusionary
rule's rationales. 6 7 Relying on Tucker, the Court stated that improper
police action, taken in good faith reliance on current standards,
would not be deterred by the exclusion of evidence. Therefore, the
evidence should be admitted, even though the police officers violated
the defendant's fourth amendment rights. The Court emphasized
that the judicial integrity rationale would not be affected by the ad68
mission of evidence seized illegally but in good faith.
64
65
66
67

Id
422 U.S. 531 (1975).
413 U.S. 226 (1973).
422 U.S. at 542.

68 Id at 537-38. The Court in Petier expressed its attitude on the judicial integrity issue
in stating:
[If] the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evidence
they had seized was admissible at trial, the "imperative ofjudicial integrity" is not
offended by the introduction into evidence of that material even if decisions subsequent to the search or seizure have broadened the exclusionary rule to encompass
evidence seized in that manner. It would seem to follow ... that the "imperative
of judicial integrity" is also not offended if law enforcement officials reasonably
believed in good faith that their conduct was in accordance with the law even if
decisions subsequent to the search or seizure have held that conduct of that type
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the Constitution.
Id
Judge Wilkey not only agrees that evidence seized illegally but in good faith is admissible
under a judicial integrity rationale, but urges further that "the exclusion of valid, probative,
undeniably truthful evidence undermines the reputation of and destroys the respect for the
entire judicial system." Wilkey, supra note 5, at 223. Accord, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 127, 138-39.
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In Brown v. Illinois,69 Justice Powell used a flagrant factual situation to employ Chief Justice Burger's policy 70 of differentiating between various types of fourth amendment violations based on the
nature of the taint. 7 1 Justice Powell stated that the degree of attenuation necessary to remove the taint should be greater when a "flagrantly abusive violation of Fourth Amendment rights" occurs, and
72
lesser when a "technical" fourth amendment violation occurs. Citing Tucker's willful-negligent premise, 73 Justice Powell noted that the
deterrence rationale would not be served where the fourth amendment violations are "technical" rather than "flagrantly abusive." In
such cases, "no legitimate justification for depriving the prosecution
74
of reliable and probative evidence" exists.
Although Justice Blackmun has espoused no express intent to
support a good faith exception, his majority opinion in UnitedStates v.
Janis75 has contributed to its development. Injanis, the Court held
69 422 U.S. 590 (1975). In Brown, police officers arrested the defendant without probable
cause and without a warrant, gave the defendant Miranda warnings, and received from the
defendant inculpatory statements. The Court reversed the conviction, holding that the Miranda warnings did not break the chain between the illegal arrest and the inculpatory
statements.
70 See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
71 422 U.S. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring).
The Government has several defenses to allegations of tainted evidence. One, that police
officers did not obtain the evidence as a result of the illegal search or seizure, but from an
independent source. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
Two, that the causal connection between the illegal conduct and the evidence is so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963). Three,
that the admission of tainted evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See I W.
RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 3.3 (1980); 1 B. GEORGE,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 274-75 (1976).
Justice Powell sought in Brown to add a fourth defense: "the point at which the taint can
be said to have dissipated should be related, in the absence of other controlling circumstances,
to the nature of that taint." 422 U.S. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring).
72 422 U.S. at 610 (Powell, J., concurring).
73 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), in which the Court stated:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. . . . Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
Id at 447.
74 442 U.S. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring). Because Justice Powell states that deterrence
is the only "legitimate justification" for excluding illegally seized evidence, he evidently rejects any constitutional foundation for the exclusionary rule.
75 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Injanis, Los Angeles police officers obtained a search warrant
based on a defective affidavit, and subsequently seized cash and wagering records from the
defendant. A police officer reported the defendant's wagering income to the Internal Revenue Service, which asserted a deficiency against the defendant. The Court agreed that the
police officers illegally seized the evidence, which was therefore inadmissible in the state pros-
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that evidence seized by a state police officer in good faith reliance on
a warrant that a court later declares defective is admissible in a federal tax proceeding. Since the illegally seized evidence is already
inadmissible in state and federal criminal trials, any deterrence added by excluding the evidence in a civil proceeding is marginal and
"does not outweigh the cost to society" of excluding reliable evidence. 76 The Court also noted the police officers' good faith, "a facreduces significantly the potential
tor that the Court has recognized
'77
deterrent effect of exclusion."
The major contribution to the good faith exception's development, however, was Justice White's dissent in Stone v. Powell.78 Justice White defined a good faith exception as the nonapplication of
the exclusionary rule "where the evidence at issue was seized by an
officer acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported
'79
with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief."
According to Justice White's definition, a good faith exception would
not apply where a police officer had only a subjective belief that his
actions were consistent with the fourth amendment. 80 The exception
would apply, however, where that subjective belief was also objectively reasonable. 8 t
A good faith exception applies to two types of fourth amendment violations-good faith mistakes and technical violations-declared Justice White.8 2 The good faith mistake occurs when a police
officer must make a judgment as to fourth amendment probable
cause where the underlying facts, the law, or the reliability of information the officer receives may be unclear. The police officer must
judge whether to make an arrest, or conduct a search, though realizing that courts may differ on whether probable cause existed "no
ecution, but held the evidence admissible in the federal tax proceeding because exclusion
would not deter the police officers. The Court also noted the police officers' "good-faith reliance on a warrant that later proved to be defective ... " Id at 447.
76 Id at 453-54.
77 Id at 458-59 n.35, rel'ingon United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), and Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
78 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (where a state court provided the opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a fourth amendment claim, federal courts will deny habeus corpus relief if the
relief is sought because the state court admitted evidence obtained by an illegal search and
seizure).
79 Id at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
80 See note 53 supra.
81 428 U.S. at 540 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger concurred in the Court's
judgment and supported Justice White's good faith exception. The ChiefJustice urged either
an acceptance of the exception or a complete rejection of the exclusionary rule. Id at 500-01.
82 Id at 538-39.
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matter how reasonable the grounds. . appeared to the officer and
83
though reasonable men could easily differ on the question."
The second type of fourth amendment violation to which a good
faith exception could apply is the technical violation, occurring when
the law changes after the police officer has made his decision in reliance upon the former law. A court will then hold that technically no
probable cause existed, even though it actually existed when the of84
ficer made his decision.
Justice White's Stone dissent concluded that, with both the good
faith mistake and the technical violation, the costs of exclusion outweigh any deterrent benefits:
In these situations,

..

excluding the evidence will not further

the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is
painfully apparent that in each of them the officer is acting as a
reasonable officer would and should act in similar
circumstances ...
When law enforcement personnel have acted mistakenly, but
in good faith and on reasonable grounds, and yet the evidence they
have seized is later excluded, the exclusion can have no deterrent
effect. The officers, if they do their duty, will act in similar fashion
in similar circumstances in the future; and the only consequence of
the rule as presently administered is that unimpeachable and probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the truth-finding
proceedings is substantially impaired or a trial totally
function8 of
5
aborted.
Michigan v. DeFillippo,8 6 the Court's most recent decision on good
faith, applied Justice White's technical violation good faith exception. In DeFillippo, the defendant was arrested pursuant to a Detroit
ordinance that allowed police officers to stop and question anyone
whose behavior reasonably warranted further investigation for criminal activity, and to arrest those who refused to give their identification. The Court held the statute unconstitutional, but stated that the
87
arrest made in good faith reliance on the statute was appropriate.
83 Id at 539. The Supreme Court has not decided a good faith mistake case. An example of a good faith mistake case is United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cerl.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 946 (1981).
84 Stone illustrates the technical violation good faith exception. The police officer had
arrested and searched the defendant pursuant to a vagrancy statute later declared unconstitutional. Petier and Brown also involved technical violations of the fourth amendment.
85 428 U.S. at 539-40.
86 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
87 Id at 37. Cf Howard v. State (Tex. Grim. App. Sept. 19, 1979) (DeFillippotechnical
violation good faith exception distinguished and evidence suppressed because police officers
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The trial court thus erroneously suppressed evidence seized incident
to the arrest.
B.

The Fi/2h Circuit

The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Williams,88 adopted a good
faith mistake exception to the exclusionary rule. Several good faith
cases in the Fifth Circuit cleared the way for the Williams holding.
The court first accepted the technical violation good faith exception
in UnitedStatesv. Kilgen,8 9 holding that "overturning a conviction due
to an invalid statute does not automatically render the previous arrest and detention illegal absent some showing that police officials
lacked a good faith belief in the validity of the statute." 9 The Court
found that excluding reliable evidence seized pursuant to a valid
statute served no exclusionary rule rationale. 91
The Fifth Circuit apparently applied a good faith mistake exception in UnitedStates v. Hill.9 2 In Hill, the court decided that police

officers' oral testimony before a magistrate sufficiently bolstered an
otherwise deficient affidavit to provide probable cause for issuing a
search warrant. In holding that the trial court should not have excluded the evidence gained by using the search warrant, the court
focused on the police officers' good faith in appearing before a magistrate. The court found that any error in the warrant-obtaining proseized the evidence pursuant to a statute so blatantly unconstitutional that good faith reliance
on it was impossible).
88 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 946 (1981). See text
accompanying note 7 supra.
89 445 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971). In Kilgen, the defendant, while detained by the police for
violating a vagrancy ordinance, confessed to stealing postage stamps. The confession was
admissible and the conviction upheld because of the police officers' good faith reliance on the
vagrancy ordinance, even though a court later declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
90 Id at 289. See a/so United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); Moffet v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1975). In
United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976), the
court, in a case similar to Kilgen, stated:
We require police officers to keep abreast of the changing contours of criminal
and constitutional law as they develop through legislative action and judicial decision. But we have been reluctant to, and will not in this case, also require that they
forecast future judicial decisions as to the constitutionality of the statutes under
which they must make arrests. There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that
the arresting officers did not believe that the. . . loitering ordinance was constitutionally valid. . . . Under such circumstances, we must reject the [defendants']
attempt to assert the unconstitutionality of the ordinance to invalidate their arrest.
Id at 445.
91 The Court also relied on Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), which allowed a good
faith defense to police officers defending civil actions.
92 500 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1974).

[Vol. 57:112]

NOTES

cedure in Hill did not justify excluding the evidence gained, because
exclusion "would in no way serve the deterrent purposes of the
rule."' 93 Although the court labeled the violation a "technical" one,
it was not a technical violation coming under a good faith exception,
because there was no good faith reliance on a law or procedure that
was later changed. The court should have labeled Hill a good faith
mistake case. If the police officers were mistaken, they had acted reasonably and in good faith by attempting to comply with the legal
requirements for obtaining a warrant.
Having tacitly accepted the good faith mistake exception in
Hill, the Fifth Circuit expressly adopted it in Williams.94 In that
case, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, knowing
that an appeal bond restricted Williams to Ohio, saw her deplane a
Los Angeles to Atlanta flight. The DEA agent arrested her for "bail
jumping" 95 before she could board another plane. A search incident
to the arrest produced a packet of heroin, and a subsequent search
pursuant to a search warrant led to more heroin. The district court
subsequently granted the defendant's motion to suppress the heroin
evidence. A Fifth Circuit panel, Williams 1,96 affirmed the exclusion
in a two to one decision.
The Williams I majority stated that bail jumping is not a crime
unless the defendant "willfully fails to appear before any court or
judicial officer as required. . . . ,97 Therefore, the defendant had
not violated the bail jumping statute by leaving Ohio. Since the
DEA agent had no reasonable basis for believing that the defendant
had failed to appear as required, the agent did not have probable
cause to make the arrest. As a result, the subsequent searches violated the fourth amendment, requiring suppression of the heroin
evidence.
Judge Charles Clark dissented, urging the court to use Williams I
to adopt a good faith mistake exception to the exclusionary rule. 98
Relying on Stone and Calandra, Judge Clark emphasized that the exclusionary rule's purpose is "to take away any temptation of law en93 Id at 322.
94 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert,. denied, 101 S. Ct. 946 (1981). Williams was
first heard by a three-judge panel and is referred to herein as Williams I, 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.
1979). The decision alternatively adopting the good faith exception was rendered by the
Fifth Circuit on rehearing en banc and is referred to herein as Williams II, 622 F.2d 830 (5th
Cir. 1980).
95 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1976).
96 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979).
97 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1976).

98

594 F.2d at 97-98 (Charles Clark, J., dissenting).
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forcement officials to knowingl'y violate the rights of citizens by
denying to the public proof of criminal conduct disclosed by such
wrongful police activity." 99 Because the exclusionary rule applies
only when it best serves its deterrence rationale,' °° it should not apply "unless the officer knows or should know his activites transgress
the bounds of the law."10 1 The Wiliams I dissent concluded that
courts ought to judge police officers' actions by a standard of everyday practical common sense. 102
Upon rehearing en banc, in Williams 1I, there were two alternate
majorities within the twenty-four judge panel.t 0 3 The (Judge) Politz
majority held that the DEA agent validly arrested the defendant and
that the trial court should have admitted the evidence seized incident
to that arrest. 104 Since the arrest and subsequent searches were constitutional, no inquiry into the applicability of the exclusionary rule
was necessary. The (Judge) Gee majority, however, held that regardless of the arrest's validity, the trial court should have admitted the
evidence, because the DEA agent seized the evidence pursuant to an
objectively reasonable good faith mistake.10 5 Thus, the Gee majority
reasoned, the Politz majority's inquiry into the constitutionality of
the arrest and subsequent searches was unnecessary, because of the
good faith mistake exception.
The Gee majority further declared that the exclusionary rule is a
judicially created rule justified only by its deterrent effect on future
police misconduct. 06 They also stated that no deterrent value exists
99 Id (emphasis added).
100 Id, citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
101 594 F.2d at 98 (Charles Clark, J., dissenting).
102 Id The dissent added that "[w]hile the bright light of post-incident litigation permits
trained legal minds to agree that [the DEA agent] made a mistake of law, such post hoc
rationalization should not be the basis for judging his actions for purposes of applying the
exclusionary rule." Id at 97.
103 Sixteen judges of the twenty-four judge panel joined in Judge Politz's opinion to declare the arrest and searches valid ("the Politz majority"). Thirteen judges joined in an opinion by Judges Gee and Vance to declare the exclusionary rule inapplicable by operation of a
good faith exception ("the Gee majority").
104 The Politz majority relied on 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976), stating that disobedience to a
court's lawful order, such as an appeal bond restriction, is contempt of court. Furthermore,
criminal contempt for a federal court is a federal crime that need not be initiated solely by the
courts. Thus, a DEA agent has power under 21 U.S.C. § 878(3) (1976) to make a valid warrantless arrest for any federal crime that was committed in his presence. 622 F.2d at 836-39.
105 622 F.2d at 840.
106 Id at 840-41. The court reasoned that the exclusionary rule should not be applied
where it fails to deter police misconduct. Id at 841, citihg Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 48687 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); United
States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535, 538 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
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in censuring the conduct of police officers who believed that they
were acting legally. The Gee majority emphasized that subjective
good faith alone would not suffice; a police officer's belief "must...
be based on articulable premises sufficient to cause a reasonable, and
07
reasonably trained, officer to,believe that he was acting lawfully."'
The Gee majority held, therefore, that because the exclusionary rule
exists to deter only willful or flagrant police violations, 0 8 "evidence is
not to be suppressed . . . where it is discovered by officers in the

course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable,
though mistaken, belief that they are authorized." 0 9
III.

The Good Faith Exception: Critique
A. Rationales

1. Deterrence
The exclusionary rule's proponents agree that the rule should
not apply when no deterrence results."10 They agree further that the
exclusionary rule lacks a specific deterrence where police officers
have acted in objectively reasonable good faith in illegally seizing
evidende." I In Williams II, the Gee majority urged that censuring
police officers who thought they were acting legally has no deterrent
value.' 1 2 The deterrence rationale presumes that courts refuse to admit illegally seized evidence in order to teach the offending police
officer, and similarly situated officers, to use greater care in safe107 622 F.2d at 841, n.4a.
108 The Gee majority adopted a narrower view of deterrence than that expressed by the

Supreme Court. Whereas the Gee majority stated that the exclusionary rule deters only willful or flagrant fourth amendment violations, the Court in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
447 (1974) stated that the exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or negligent fourth amendment violations.
109 622 F.2d at 840.
110 See, e.g., United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 920 (1981); Friendly, supra note 4, at 951-53. The Burger Court has not applied the
exclusionary rule in the following cases for lack of deterrence: United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268 (1978) (introducing a live witness who was discovered because of a fourth amendment violation); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (denying federal habeus corpus relief
based on fourth amendment violations); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (using
evidence, illegally seized by state police officers, in a federal civil proceeding); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (questioning a grand jury witness by using illegally seized
evidence); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (using the defendant's illegally obtained
statements to impeach the defendant's trial testimony).
111 See, e.g., People v. Tindal, 69 A.D.2d 58, 61-2, 418 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (1979).
112 622 F.2d at 842. The court noted that it would be possible to deter police officers who
thought they were acting legally only if "we somehow wish to deter them from acting at all."
Id The latter is precisely Justice Brennan's view in his UnitedStates v. Peltier dissent. See notes
113-18 inra and accompanying text.
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guarding fourth amendment rights. However, because police officers
are likely to repeat good faith actions in similar situations, "the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct
"Il 13

Justice Brennan, however, disagrees that the deterrence rationale warrants a good faith mistake exception.1 14 In his view, the exclusionary rule's purpose is to deter the law enforcement community
in general, since the offending police officer will probably never receive an individual punishment for his fourth amendment violation. 115 Thus, the exclusionary rule serves to remove the inducement
for all police officers to violate the fourth amendment." 16 Justice
Brennan argues further that a good faith mistake exception would
encourage law enforcement officials to act on doubt. If a police officer is unsure whether probable cause is present, but believes his seizing of evidence would be "objectively reasonable," he may act upon
that belief rather than ensuring his compliance with the fourth
amendment. 1' 7 Justice Brennan emphasizes, therefore, that the exclusionary rule's purpose is to discourage police officers faced with
uncertain situations from always choosing to compromise fourth
18
amendment rights."

The deterrence rationale does not merely seek the prevention of
future misconduct by the offending police officer, which is a situation
that could justify the use of a good faith mistake exception where the
officer has acted in objectively reasonable good faith. Rather, deterrence is intended to remove the incentive of all police officers to violate the fourth amendment. Because the good faith mistake
exception's "objective reasonableness" standard does not deter, but
encourages, fourth amendment violations, the deterrence rationale
weighs heavily against the judicial adoption of the good faith mistake
exception.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544-62 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id at 557. See Oaks, Studying the Excusionag Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665, 709-i1 (1970), for a discussion of the difference between general and specific
deterrence.
116 Accord, Schrock & Welsh supra note 9, at 378 ("[t]he exclusionary rule . . . is oldfashioned self-denial").
117 Justice Brennan's analysis concerning police officers ensuring compliance with the
fourth amendment when in doubt applies only to good faith mistakes, not to technical violations. The latter involves no doubt because police officers act pursuant to then-valid law.
118 422 U.S. at 559 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113
114
115

[Vol. 57:112]

2.

NOTES

Judicial Integrity

Although deterrence is the exclusionary rule's primary rationale,
the judicial integrity rationale remains important in assessing the
rule's emerging good faith exceptions. The Court in Peltier stated
that, in both the good faith mistake and the technical violation situations, the admissibility of illegally seized evidence does not impair
judicial integrity. The Court required, however, that the police officer act in good faith and reasonably believe that his actions were
legal." 9 The Court stated further that the exclusion, not the inclusion,120 of competent evidence harms judicial integrity when a police
2
officer has seized the evidence in good faith.' '
The effect on judicial integrity of including or excluding allegedly tainted but reliable evidence depends little on whether a court
initially focuses on the violation or on the remedy.. 2 2 If a court first
decides that a fourth amendment violation occurred, a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule would permit a court to convict a
defendant by using evidence specifically found to be illegally seized.
Permitting a defendant's conviction based on illegally seized evidence impairs judicial integrity to a greater degree than excluding
illegally seized, yet reliable, evidence. On the other hand, if a court
decides first that the good faith mistake exception applies, then the
court will not reach the violation issue. Nevertheless, a court may
still impair judicial integrity by not deciding if a violation occurred,
because illegally seized evidence may still have been the basis of a
conviction.
The judicial integrity rationale demands that a court not use
illegally seized evidence to convict a defendant, regardless of the evidence's reliability or the police officer's good faith. A court that applies a good faith mistake exception will either acknowledge or will
ignore a fourth amendment violation, and thereby will at least risk
convicting the defendant with the aid of illegally seized evidence.
119 Id at 538.
120 Justice Brennan strongly dissented from the exclusive emphasis on deterrence in
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), preferring to analyze the exclusionary rule in
terms ofjudicial integrity as well. Justice Brennan urged that admitting illegally seized evidence undermines popular trust in government, regardless of how the police officer obtained
the evidence. Id at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the Court today discounts to the point of
extinction the vital function of the [exclusionary] rule f,which is] to insure that the judiciary
avoid even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government conduct").
121 See Wilkey, supra note 5, at 223 ("the exclusion of valid, probative, undeniably truthful
evidence undermines the reputation of and destroys the respect for the entire judicial system'); Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1036 n.53.'
122 See text accompanying notes 133-42 infra.
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The greatest blow to judicial integrity is not the exclusion of tainted
yet reliable evidence; it is the lack of a remedy for a clear fourth
amendment violation.
B.

Effect on Police Officers

An evidentiary suppression hearing focuses exclusively on the
police officer, determining whether the officer had violated the fourth
amendment. Justice Brennan has expressed concern that a good
faith mistake exception to the exclusionary rule would "vastly exacerbate" this focus on the police officer.12 3 However, his concern is
unrealistic, since the suppression hearing will alway focus sole' on
the police, even if courts adopt the good faith mistake exception.
Because the exclusionary rule's primary rationale is deterrence
of future police misconduct, the rule's major purpose is educating
police officers concerning the scope of their search and seizure powers. In Williams II, Judge Hill concurred with the Gee majority, stating that the good faith mistake exception encourages police officers to
learn fourth amendment law rather than rewarding their ignorance
by admitting illegally seized evidence at trial.12 4 He reasoned that,
since the good faith mistake exception includes an objective reasonableness standard as well as a subjective good faith standard, police
officers must maintain objective reasonableness in fourth amend12 5
ment-related conduct.
The exclusionary rule, however, requires a police officer to act
with probable cause, which is a more exacting standard for the officer than is objective reasonableness. The good faith mistake exception applies when a police officer has acted without probable cause,
thereby violating the fourth amendment. The exception admits the
illegally seized evidence if the officer acted in objectively reasonable
123 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 561 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124 622 F.2d at 848 (Hill, J., concurring specially).
125 Judge Rubin, however, was uneasy with Judge Hill's assertion that an objectively reasonable good faith exception would encourage learning. Judge Rubin stated:
A policeman who is in completely good faith is unlikely to stop to ask himself, "Am
I also reasonable?" The additional criterion that the mistaken belief that the officer
is also acting correctly must also be reasonable suggests uneasiness with the reliability of the good faith test. It cannot be justified on the unsupported proposition that
if the police know good faith alone will not suffice, they will also be encouraged to
learn constitutional law and deterred from acting in either ignorance or
unreasonableness.
Id at 850 n.4 (Rubin, J., concurring specially). Judge Rubin must therefore believe that
police officers will not learn fourth amendment doctrine, but will act solely on what they
believe to be their authority. If he is correct, then society cannot reasonably expect police
officers to ask if their actions meet a stricter probable cause standard.
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good faith. Thus, objective reasonableness is necessarily a lower objective standard than the present probable cause standard. As a result, the good faith mistake exception does not, as Judge Hill
correctly asserts, reward a police officer's ignorance, 26 but does encourage him to learn less than the present probable cause
27
standard.1
Legal commentators have criticized the present exclusionary
rule for creating the "occasion and incentive for large-scale lying by
law enforcement officers."1 28 They state further that courts adopting
a good faith mistake exception will spur an even greater incentive for
police officer perjury, because of the exception's emphasis on subjective good faith. Because the good faith mistake exception requires
objective reasonableness in addition to subjective good faith,1 29 it is
questionable whether police officers will admit bad faith when their
actions were proper as measured against the applicable objective
standard. 3 0 Professor Amsterdam states that "[a] subjective purpose
to do something that the applicable legal rules say there is sufficient
objective cause to do can be fabricated all too easily and undetectably." 13
' Courts that choose to adopt a good faith mistake exception
must prevent this result by requiring the state to prove good faith,
rather than merely believing the police officer's testimony or forcing
the defendant to prove bad faith. Each court should establish a uniform standard of proof by which to measure alleged good faith. Salient factors should include the offending police officer's motive, ie.,
126 Contra, Kamisar, Is the Exclusionagy Rule an '1logical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 84 n. 112 (1978), quoting Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1044
("[the good faith exception] 'would put a premium on the ignorance of the police officer and,
more significantly, on the department which trains him' "). Professor Kaplan, however,
made that statement when discussing a purely subjective good faith exception that would
reward ignorance in the absence of objective standards. An objectively reasonable good faith
exception would not put a premium on ignorance because searches and seizures must meet
objective standards.
127 Contra, Bernardi, supra note 4, at 106 ("it seems highly imprudent to depend primarily
upon the speculative assistance of the exclusionary rule to educate police in fourth amendment requirements").
128 Oaks, Studying the Exdcusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 755
(1970). Accord, Wilkey, supira note 5, at 226; Note, The Exclusionar Rule in Search and Seizure:
Examination and Prognosis, 20 KAN. L. REV. 768, 778-79 (1972).
129 See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
130 Accord, Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Eclusionay Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151, 180 (1979) ("[it seems] a rather tenuous basis for
limiting access to fourth amendment rights [to believe] that police officers will conscientiously
report to judicial or prosecutorial authorities all instances in which bad faith motivated the
search or seizure").
131 Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 437.
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whether there is sufficient evidence without the evidence seized illegally but in good faith, whether the police officer acted on independent legal advice, whether the officer acted in an emergency situation,
and the officer's prior experience in similar situations.1 32 Adoption of
such a procedure will assure the public that courts will not ignore the
subjective element.
C. Admni'slrative Problems
Proper analysis of a good faith mistake exception requires that
trial courts determine the existence of both subjective good faith and
objective reasonableness in the police officer's conduct. Proof of a
police officer's subjective good faith adds a difficult fact-finding operation for the trial court. Furthermore, a trial court's case-by-case discretion in defining objective reasonableness could result in widely
divergent factual findings, unreviewable on appeal. 133 The exclusionary rule could thus lose whatever certainty of application it now
has. The Supreme Court should, therefore, if it adopts the good faith
mistake exception, define "objective reasonableness" and set forth
34

standards of proof.1

In addition, courts that adopt a good faith exception should em35
ploy the logical analytical framework found in Scott v. UnitedStates.'
In Scott, the Supreme Court established chronological review as the
proper order of analysis in fourth amendment cases. First, a court
must determine whether the police officer lacked probable cause and
thereby violated the fourth amendment. This objective inquiry involves no consideration of the police officer's state of mind. Second,
the court must decide whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for the fourth amendment violation. If the court employs
a good faith exception, it would only consider subjective good faith
132 Other factors, useful for proving objective reasonableness as well as good faith, could
include the following: (1) the police officer's statements to the defendant and to other officers; (2) statements made to the offending officer by other officers; (3) the officer's statements to non-officer third parties; (4) whether the officer contacted or attempted to contact
his superiors or a prosecutor to request advice; and (5). whether the officer acted pursuant to a
third-party tip.
133 See Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1045 (such case-by-case discretion could constitute "almost
an open invitation to nullification at the trial court level"). Although Professor Kaplan made
this comment in a purely subjective good faith context, the addition of another difficult factfinding operation is nevertheless a concern in the objectively reasonable good faith context.
See generally United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 560 n.20 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Kamisar, upra note 126, at 84 n. 112.
134 See note 132 sufpra, and accompanying text.
135 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that where objective standards are met, there is no fourth
amendment violation even where police officers act in subjective bad faith).
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in the second inquiry.136
The application of Scott's chronological analysis will have two
significant results. First, a trial court's fact-finding burden will increase if it employs the good faith mistake exception, because certain
cases would require a determination of both a fourth amendment
violation and an alleged good faith mistake.1 37 Second, Scott's chronological analysis clearly distinguishes between the violation and the
remedy. Because a court would consider good faith with respect to
the remedy only after finding a fourth amendment violation, a finding of good faith would not hide a fourth amendment violation's
existence. 138
Scott's chronological analysis, however, contravenes the doctrine
that a court will not decide a constitutional issue unless strictly necessary.139 If the record presents another ground upon which the case
can be decided, then the court should not address the constitutional
issue.14 0 The two concurring opinions in Williams II illustrate the
tension between Scott's chronological analysis an, the strict necessity
doctrine.14 1 Judge Rubin, concurring with the Politz majority, employed Scott's chronological analysis in stating tha\ the Gee majority
should have delayed its "hypothetical" decision to adopt the good
faith mistake exception until a case arose in which a police officer
had violated the fourth amendment. "Only in [the] event [that a
police officer violated a defendant's fourth amendment rights] would
136 Id at 135-36.
137 As a result of Scott's chronological analysis, there is no substitution of one fact-finding
operation (application of the exclusionary rule) for another (whether a constitutional violation exists). Judge Friendly supports the substitution advantage. See Friendly, supra note 4,
at 953 ("the recognition of a penumbral zone where mistake will not call for the drastic
remedy of exclusion would relieve [judges] of exceedingly difficult decisions whether an officer
overstepped the sometimes almost imperceptible line between a valid arrest or search and an
invalid one").
138 Contra, Ball, supra note 12, at 644 ("a reasonable although mistaken reliance upon the
validity of a statute or construction of a statute is sufficient to establish probable cause, and
that probable cause continues to render the search reasonable even when the statute or construction is subsequently rejected").
139 See Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549,574-85 (1947); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[the Court] will
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of").
140 The strict necessity doctrine generally involves two violations, where one is of constitutional import. The good faith exception concerns a violation and a remedy. Nevertheless, the
strict necessity doctrine concerns deciding the nonconstitutional "ground," and is not limited
to situations involving only violations.
141 622 F.2d at 848-51 (Rubin, J., concurring specially); id at 847-48 (Hill, J., concurring
specially).
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it be necessary to consider whether evidence unconstitutionally taken
must be suppressed."' 42 Judge Hill, on the other hand, concurring
with the Gee majority, emphasized that the court should decide the
search's constitutionality under the fourth amendment only as a last
resort. Thus, "if we find the evidence admissible without regard to
the constitutional question, we should decline to reach and decide
43
the [constitutional question].'
The strict necessity doctrine urges that a court "not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of.'

44

Thus, the doctrine leads to the illogical and unsound

result that a court would determine the exclusionary rule's applicability before it reaches the constitutional violation issue. Because the
strict necessity doctrine is only a constructional rule of preference, the
courts need not follow it. Therefore, if a court adopts a good faith
exception, it should employ Scott's chronological analysis, and determine whether a police officer has violated the fourth amendment
before the court determines the appropriate remedy for that
violation.
IV.

Conclusion

The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that penalizes police officers who violate the fourth amendment's probable
cause requirement. The exclusionary rule's purpose is to deter future
police misconduct, and not to enforce the personal rights of aggrieved individuals; therefore, the Constitution does not require the
rule. As a result, a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a
remedial modification, and is not barred by the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court has already adopted the good faith technical violation exception. Police officers must operate within the confines of present legal requirements; society cannot hold them to
standards elucidated in later judicial decisions or statutes. On the
other hand, the Court should not, for several reasons, adopt the good
faith mistake exception.
First, the deterrence sought by the exclusionary rule is general,
not specific. A court that admits unconstitutionally seized evidence,
because the police officer acted in objectively reasonable good faith,
vindicates the offending officer. Thus, that officer and all similarly
142 Id at 848 (Rubin, J., concurring specially).
143 Id at 847 (Hill, J., concurring specially).
144 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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situated police officers have an incentive to repeat conduct that falls
short of the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement. Society has the right to expect police officers to uphold the fourth amendment when they face doubtful situations.
Second, the good faith mistake exception leaves a right without
a remedy. After a court determines that the police officer did not
meet fourth amendment requirements, the court's application of the
good faith mistake exception would result in an unremedied fourth
amendment violation. Even if a court determines first that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable regardless of a violation, police officers
could have violated the fourth amendment. Certainly the previous
Courts that decided Weeks, Wolf and Mapp did not intend any procedure that would leave fourth amendment violations unredressed.
Third, the good faith mistake exception encourages police officers to be more ignorant of fourth amendment law than under the
current probable cause standard. If police officers can learn what is
"objectively reasonable" within the meaning of the exception, then
they should also learn the probable cause requirements.
Finally, the good faith mistake exception causes two significant
administrative problems-an added fact-finding operation and an
undefined standard of "objective reasonableness." The exception requires courts to adjudicate an objective element, as is currently done
with probable cause, and an added subjective element. The triable
issues increase even if a court chooses to analyze the exclusionary
rule's applicability before deciding whether a police officer committed a fourth amendment violation. Furthermore, no court has yet
defined "objective reasonableness." Particularly in the Fifth Circuit,
where United States v. Williams allows the courts to apply the exception but fails to give them guidance on what degree of proof they
should require, trial courts are likely to establish widely divergent
standards concerning what is objectively reasonable.
Should a court choose to adopt the good faith mistake exception, however, it should adopt certain procedures to mitigate the exception's shortcomings. First, the court must place on the state a
uniform burden of proof concerning a police officer's good faith. Second, the court must set forth a uniform definition of "objective reasonableness." Finally, the court should, in good faith cases, adopt a
chronological form of analysis. This analysis determines first
whether the police officer committed a fourth amendment violation,
and then examines the applicability of the exclusionary rule.
The public places enormous pressure on police departments to
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solve and prevent crime. 145 Police officers find it difficult to make
immediate fourth amendment judgments, particularly when a court
may, after months of detached deliberation, narrowly decide otherwise. The good faith mistake exception lowers objective fourth
amendment standards, and thus does no more to teach police officers
what is consistent with the fourth amendment. Rather, a lesser standard eliminates much of the police officers' uncertainty concerning
probable cause, and authorizes conduct that falls short of the probable cause requirement. Instead of legitimizing and encouraging conduct that violates the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court should
teach police officers the fourth amendment requirements. The Court
must therefore redefine probable cause, reasonableness, and "reasonable expectation of privacy" so that police officers understand the
limitations on their power. Deterrence of future police misconduct,
the current rationale of the exclusionary rule, is only possible if police
officers know why certain conduct was wrong and whether it will be
wrong again if repeated. The Court should not, however, give up on
the fourth amendment by adopting the good faith mistake exception
46
to the exclusionary rule. 1

Ralph E. Dejong

145 See, e.g., Bernardi, supra note 4, at 52 ("[the adoption of a good faith exception] will
lessen the tension which presently exists between the need for effective law enforcement and
the desire to protect fourth amendment rights"); Address by Chief Justice Burger to the
American Bar Association (Feb. 8, 1981).
146 Accord, 34 VAND. L. REv. 213 (1981); 15 GA. L. REv. 487 (1981); contra, Attorney
General's Task Force Report on Violent Crime, Final Report, at 55-56 (Aug. 17, 1981).

